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On the Optimality of Keyless Authentication in a
Noisy Model
Shaoquan Jiang
Abstract—We further study the keyless authentication problem
in a noisy model in our previous work, where no secret setup is
available for sender Alice and receiver Bob while there is DMC
W1 from Alice to Bob and a two-way noiseless but insecure
channel between them. We propose a construction such that
the message length over DMC W1 does not depend on the size
of the source space. If the source space is S and the number
of channel W1 uses is n, then our protocol only has a round
complexity of log∗ |S|− log∗ n+4. In addition, we show that the
round complexity of any secure protocol in our model is lower
bounded by log∗ |S| − log∗ n− 5. We also obtain a lower bound
on the success probability when the message size on DMC W1
is given. Finally, we derive the capacity for a non-interactive
authentication protocol under general DMCs, which extends the
result under BSCs in our previous work.
Index Terms—Authentication, information theoretical security,
discrete memoryless channel, lower bound, round complexity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Message authentication is a protocol that allows a sender
Alice to send a source state S to a receiver Bob such that the
latter is assured of the authenticity. This mechanism was first
studied by [15] in a form of a non-interactive protocol, called
a message authentication code (MAC).
Security of an information system usually is quantified
through analyzing a number of attacks. There are two types
of attacks for a message authentication protocol. In the type
I attack, the attacker Oscar plays between Alice and Bob and
can modify, block, delete the messages over the channel. He
succeeds if Bob finally accepts a source state S′ that is not
authenticated by Alice. This is known as a substitution attack.
In the type II attack, Oscar impersonates Alice to directly
authenticate a source state S to Bob. He succeeds if Bob finally
accepts S. This is known as an impersonation attack.
The success probability of Oscar is closely related to his
time complexity. A probabilistic polynomial time is a widely
adopted complexity class. However, in this work, we are
interested in the information theoretical security, where Oscar
has an infinite time complexity. The advantage of this type
of system is that the security does not rely on any hardness
assumption (such as factoring assumption [27]).
To achieve authentication, Alice must have some resource
that can distinguish herself from Oscar. For example, if Alice
and Bob share a common secret [15], then this secret can play
this role. In the literature, a signing key of a signature [27]
and a private key [5] of a public key encryption scheme are
also examples of this role. In this work, we consider the case,
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where a noisy channel for Alice better in some sense than that
for Oscar will play as this role.
Channel noise traditionally plays an undesired role in many
areas. However, Wyner [30] showed that the channel noise
can be used to establish a common secret for Alice and Bob.
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [12] generalized this result to a broadcast
channel. Since then, key agreement over a noisy channel has
been extensively studied [1], [14], [19], [2], [23], [24], [6].
Other secure mechanisms over a noisy channel were also
studied; see [9], [11], [26] for oblivious transfers and [4], [8],
[10], [29] for commitments. Surveys on information theoretical
security over noisy channels can be found in [22], [7].
A. Related works
Authentication that uses a noise as an advantageous resource
has been studied in the literature but far from being well-
studied (to our knowledge). Baracca et al [3] studied the
physical layer authentication over MIMO fading wiretap chan-
nels, where they assumed no shared key but an authenticated
initialization from the sender to the receiver. Korzhik et al [20]
considered an authentication problem over a (noiseless) public
discussion channel and an initialization using noisy channels.
Lai et al [21] considered a noisy authentication model with
a shared key, where the sender-receiver channel is better than
the sender-adversary channel. Our previous work [17] studied
a new authentication model. In this model, Alice and Bob
share no key. There is a discrete memoryless channel W1 from
Alice to Bob and a DMC W2 from Oscar to Bob. There is
also a noiseless channel between any two of Alice, Bob and
Oscar. Oscar can read any message from Alice (over channel
W1 or noiselessly) or from Bob (noiselessly) in the clear text.
He can also arbitrarily modify the message over the noiseless
channel between Alice and Bob. But the message over channel
W1 can not be tampered. In addition, Oscar can impersonate
Alice to send any message to Bob using his channel W2. A
characterization of the (in)existence in this model was given
in [17]. Given the existence, an efficient construction was
proposed. Further, the non-interactive authentication capacity
with BSC W1 and BSC W2 was given. Authentication that
tries to remove the noise pollution on the data has been studied
in the literature. For instance, Martinian et al [25] considered
an authentication with a legal distortion and Yu et al [28]
considered a covert authentication over a noisy channel. This
type of work is not our interest as we consider a noise as an
advantageous resource to achieve the authentication.
2B. Contribution
This paper further studies the keyless authentication prob-
lem in the noisy model [17]. We extend the construction in
[17] to authenticate a source state of any length using a fixed
length n of DMC messages over W1, while in [17], n heavily
depends on the size of the source space S. Our price is a
round complexity of log∗ |S| − log∗ n+ 4 while the protocol
in [17] has only 3 rounds. However, we show that the round
complexity of any secure protocol in our model must be lower
bounded by log∗ |S|− log∗ n−5. This shows that our protocol
is nearly round optimal. We remark that this lower bound does
not contradict the 3-round protocol in [17] as n ≥ log log |S|
C
there, where C is the Shannon capacity of W1. We also obtain
a lower bound on the success probability of Oscar. Finally,
we obtain the capacity for a non-interactive authentication
protocol in our model with general DMCs W1,W2 (which
extends of the result in [17] with BSC W1 and BSC W2),
where the authentication capacity is the maximum achievable
ratio log |S|
n
.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Notions. We list notions that will be used later.
• Random variable is abbreviated as RV.
• Denote a RV by a capital letter (e.g., X), its realization
by a lower case letter (e.g., x) and its alphabet space by
a calligraphic letter (e.g., X ).
• xn denotes a sequence x1, · · · , xn of length n.
• PX is the distribution of X (i.e., PX(x) = P (X = x)).
Similarly, PY |X(b|a) def= P (Y = b|X = a).
• Tzn(·) for zn ∈ Zn is a distribution over Z with Tzn(u)
being the fraction of u in zn for any u ∈ Z.
• PnX(x
n)
def
=
∏n
i=1 PX(xi).
• i.i.d. denotes an independent and identical distribution.
• Function negl(n) is negligible in n if for any polynomial
f(n), limn→∞ negl(n)f(n) = 0.
• log(j) x = log · · · log︸ ︷︷ ︸
j
(x) (i.e., the composition of log
function for j times).
• log∗ n is the minimum i such that log(i) n < 2.
• Convex hull Cov(S) for a set S of vectors is the set of
all possible convex combinations of vectors in S.
• [n] denote the set {1, · · · , n}.
• For S ⊆ [p] and a matrix W = (W1, · · · ,Wp)T with row
vectors W1, · · · ,Wp, define WS = {Ws | s ∈ S}.
• Statistical distance between RVs X and X ′ is
∆(X,X ′) =
∑
x |PX(x) − PX′(x)|. We also denote
it by ∆(PX , PX′). For any distribution P over X
and a compact set of distributions S over X , define
∆(P,S)=minQ∈S ∆(P,Q).
• Hamming distance dH(xn, yn)=|{i | xi 6= yi, i ∈ [n]}|.
• The binary entropy function h(α) = −α logα − (1 −
α) log(1− α) for α ∈ [0, 1].
A. Discrete memoryless channel
A discrete channel with input X over X = {a1, · · · , ap}
and output Y over Y = {b1, · · · , bq} is denoted by a stochastic
matrix
W =


W (b1|a1) · · · W (bq|a1)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
W (b1|ap) · · · W (bq|ap)

 ,
where W (y|x) = PY |X(y|x). In this case, we say X and
Y are connected by channel W . The channel is discrete
memoryless (DMC) if PY n|Xn(yn|xn) =
∏n
i=1W (yi|xi). It is
non-redundant if ∆
(
Wi, Cov(W[p]\{i})
)
> 0 for any i ∈ [p].
A n-length code C for W : X → Y with source S
is described by an encoding scheme f : S → Xn and a
decoding scheme φ : Yn → S ∪ {⊥}. A decoding result
⊥ denotes a detection of error. For S ∈ S, f(S) ∈ Xn is
called a codeword. When f(S) is sent over W and received as
Y n ∈ Yn, the receiver will decode it to φ(Y n). If φ(Y n) 6= S,
an error occurs. The error probability is P (φ(Y n) 6= S).
B. Typical sequences
In this subsection, we introduce the notions of typical and
conditional typical sequences [13].
Definition 1: Let X be a RV over X . We say that xn ∈ Xn
is ǫ-typical if |Txn(a) − PX(a)| ≤ ǫ|X | for any a ∈ X and
whenever PX(a) = 0, it holds that Txn(a) = 0. The set of
ǫ-typical sequences for X is denoted by Tn[X]ǫ .
Definition 2: Let X and Y be RVs over X and Y respec-
tively. yn ∈ Yn is conditionally ǫ-typical given xn ∈ Xn, if
|Txnyn(a, b)− Txn(a)PY |X(b|a)| ≤ ǫ|X |·|Y| for all a ∈ X , b ∈
Y and whenever PXY (a, b) = 0, it holds that Txnyn(a, b) = 0.
The set of conditionally ǫ-typical sequences for Y , given xn,
is denoted by Tn[Y |X]ǫ(xn), and also by T
n
[W ]ǫ(x
n) if X and
Y are connected by DMC W .
The following is a basic property of typical sequences. The
proof can be found in [13, Chapter 2].
Lemma 1: Let X and Y be RVs over X and Y respectively.
Then, there exists constants λ1 > 0 and λ2 > 0 such that
PnY (T
n
[Y ]ǫ) ≥1− 2−nλ1ǫ
2
PnY |X(T
n
[Y |X]ǫ(x
n)|xn) ≥1− 2−nλ2ǫ2 , ∀xn ∈ Tn[X]ǫ ,
when n large enough.
C. Basic inequalities
The following lemma is from [17]. It essentially states that
if the distribution TZn induced by the output Zn of a DMC W
is close to a distribution P , then P must be close to Cov(W ).
Lemma 2: Let P be a distribution over Z . Let Zn be an
output of DMC W : X → Z with input Xn. If
PZn
(
|TZn(u)− P (u)| ≤ ǫ1, for all u ∈ Z
)
> ǫ2, (1)
for some ǫ1, ǫ2 > 0, then
∆
(
P ;Cov(W )
)
≤ |Z|ǫ1 + |Z|
√
ln (2/ǫ2)
2n
. (2)
The next lemma is taken from [18]. It essentially states that
if xn and x¯n has a large distance, then sending xn through a
3non-redundant DMC W is unlikely to result in an output Y n
that is conditionally ǫ-typical with x¯n.
Lemma 3: Let Y n be the output of a non-redundant DMC
W : X → Y with input Xn. Then for any xn, x¯n ∈ Xn with
dH(x¯
n, xn) = αn, any ǫ ∈ (0,Θα) and α > 0, it holds that
PY n|Xn
(
Tn[W ]ǫ(x¯
n)
∣∣∣xn) ≤ 2− 2n(αΘ−ǫ)2|X|2|Y|2 , (3)
where Θ = mini∆
(
Wi, Cov(W[p]\{i})
)
and the rows of W
are W1, · · · ,Wp.
The following lemma is a special case of [18, Lemma 6].
Lemma 4: For 1/n ≤ α ≤ 1/2, there exists a subset Vα ⊆
Xn with
|Vα| ≥ 1
αn
|X |n2−n(h(α)+α log |X |)
such that dH(xn1 , xn2 ) ≥ αn for any distinct xn1 , xn2 ∈ Vα.
D. (v, b, r, λ)-Set System
We now introduce the (v, b, r, λ)-set system in [17], which
is extended from block design [16].
Definition 3: Let V be a set of size v and B =
{B1, · · · ,Bb} (called blocks) be a collection of subsets of V.
Then, (V,B) is a (v, b, r, λ)-set system if
1. Each x ∈ V belongs to at least r blocks.
2. Any x, y ∈ V simultaneously appear in at most λ blocks.
The following lemma is a rephrase of an existence result
proved in [17].
Lemma 5: Let v, b, t ∈ N with b = ⌊ 2t+8
ǫ4
log v⌋
and v ≥ 2 and 0 < ǫ < 1. Then, there exists a
(v, b, 2−.25t−2ǫb, 2−.5t−2ǫ2b)-set system.
The above lemma shows that the existence of a set system
with b > 512ǫ−4 log v. We now prove that b > log v actually
holds for any set system with ǫ < 1. Although this result will
not be directly used in this paper, it is the main motivation
that leads us to the lower bound on the round complexity in
Section V.
Lemma 6: Let (V,B1, · · · ,Bb} be a (v, b, r, λ)-set system
with λ < r. Then, b > log v.
Proof. For any s ∈ V , define a b-bit string I(s), where
the ith bit I(s)i = 1 if and only if s ∈ Bi. As any distinct
s1, s2 ∈ V simultaneously appear in at most λ < r blocks
while each of s1, s2 appears in at least r blocks, it follows
that I(s1) 6= I(s2). Hence, I(·) is an injection from V to
{0, 1}b. Since I(s) is a b-bit string with at least r positions
being 1, v ≤ 2b −∑r−1i=0 (bi). That is, b > log v. 
III. AUTHENTICATION MODEL
In this section, we introduce the noisy authentication model
over DMCs in [17]. It consists of two DMCs: W1 : X → Z
from Alice to Bob and DMC W2 : Y → Z from Oscar to
Bob. Between Alice and Bob, there exists a two-way noiseless
channel. Alice will use W1 and the noiseless channel to
authenticate a source state to Bob. Oscar is an attacker. He
can read the messages sent over the two-way noiseless channel
and channel W1. He can also tamper the messages on the two-
way noiseless channel. Allowing Oscar to control the noiseless
channel is to capture the concern that this channel is neither
confidential nor authenticated. Allowing Oscar to see Alice’s
message over the DMC W1 is to capture the concern that this
channel may leak some information. One might think that let
Oscar know the full input of W1 is unnecessary. However,
we prefer this as it simplifies the model and also provides a
stronger security guarantee.
After rounds of interactions, Bob can decide whether to
accept the authentication. When he accepts, he outputs a
source state; otherwise, he outputs a special symbol ⊥. If Bob
detects an error before completing the interaction, he outputs
⊥ and aborts immediately. The formal description follows.
1) Communication model: Let S be the source space, from
which Alice draws a source state S for authentication. Let πn
be a ν-round authentication protocol with totally n symbols
transmitted over channel W1. Each party has a basic input and
a random input (a uniformly random binary string which is
the randomness source in the execution for this party). Alice’s
basic input is S and random input is rA, while Bob’s basic
input is empty and random input is rB. If the list of messages a
party has received so far is T , then his (or her) next action (e.g.,
generating a local output, an outgoing message or making a
reject/accept decision) is completely determined by his basic
input, random input and T . We use πn(A, rA, T ) to denote
Alice’s next action function and πn(B, rB , T ) to denote Bob’s
next action function. The interaction is as follows, where n =∑ν
i=1 ni.
A-1: Alice computes (Xn11 , u1) = πn(A,S, rA). She
sends Xn11 over channel W1 and u1 over the noise-
less channel, to Bob. Oscar will see Xn11 , Z
n1
1 and
u1. He can modify u1 to u′1. Bob will receive Z
n1
1
from channel W1 and u′1 from the noiseless channel.
B-1: Upon Zn11 , u′1, Bob computes and sends v1 =
πn(B, rB , Z
n1
1 , u
′
1) to Alice over the noiseless chan-
nel. Through Oscar, Alice will receive v′1.
.
.
.
A-i: Upon v′i−1, Alice computes
(Xnii , ui) = πn(A,S, rA, v
′
1|v′2| · · · |v′i−1).
He sends Xnii over channel W1 and ui over the
noiseless channel. Oscar will see Xnii , Z
ni
i and ui.
He can modify ui to u′i. Bob will receive Z
ni
i from
channel W1 and u′i from the noiseless channel.
B-i: Upon Znii , u′i, Bob computes and sends
vi = πn(B, rB , Z
n1
1 |u′1|Zn22 |u′2| · · · |Znii |u′i)
to Alice over the noiseless channel, which, through
Oscar, becomes v′i.
.
.
.
B-ν: Upon Znνν , u′ν , Bob computes
S′ = πn(B, rB , Zn11 |u′1|Zn22 |u′2| · · · |Znνν |u′ν)
for S′ ∈ S∪{⊥}, where S′ =⊥ means that he rejects
the authentication while S′ 6=⊥ means that he agrees
that S′ is authenticated from Alice.
If Alice (or Bob) detects any inconsistency before the
protocol completion, she (or he) can reject and abort the
execution immediately.
42) Security model: The security model is described in terms
of two attacks. In a type I attack, Oscar can change the
messages over the two-way noiseless channel between Alice
and Bob. He succeeds if Bob accepts a source state that
is different from Alice’s input. In a type II attack, Oscar
can impersonate Alice to authenticate a source state using
W2 and a noiseless channel. He succeeds if Bob accepts his
authentication. The formal description is as follows.
Admissible Attacks:
I. During the execution of πn between Alice and Bob,
Oscar can see (Xnii , Z
ni
i , ui) from Alice and vi from
Bob. He can modify ui to any u′i and vi to any v′i. He
succeeds if Bob outputs S′ ∈ {S,⊥}.
II. Oscar can impersonate Alice to execute πn with Bob,
except that the noisy channel W1 is replaced by W2. He
succeeds in this attack if Bob outputs S′ 6=⊥ .
We use succ to denote a success event in a type I or II attack.
Security definition: In this paper, we assume by default that
an honest Alice (or Bob) follows the protocol with a random
input that is a uniformly random binary string. However,
we also consider an honest Alice or Bob who follows the
protocol specification with some r ∈ {0, 1}∗ as the random
input. In this case, we call her (or him) an admissible user.
Now the security consists of two properties: correctness and
authentication. The correctness requires that if an admissible
Alice authenticates S to Bob when no attack is performed,
Bob should output S′ = S. The authentication requires that
Oscar will never succeed in a type I or II attack.
Definition 4: An authentication protocol πn for source S is
secure if it satisfies two properties.
• Correctness. For any admissible Alice, Bob outputs
S′ 6= S only negligibly (in n) if no attack is performed.
• Authentication. Under type I and type II attacks,
Pr(succ) is negligible in n.
Note that here we require the error probability to be negli-
gible (see Section II) as this is the widely accepted quantity
for a probabilistic event that is unlikely to occur.
3) Authentication rate and authentication capacity: We
regard the noisy channel as an expensive resource and the
noiseless channel as a cheap source. So we are interested
in maximizing the efficiency of channel W1 and define the
authentication rate of πn as the ratio log |S|n . The authentication
model with (W1,W2) has an authentication capacity Ca, if
any authenticate rate r < Ca can be achieved by a certain
protocol πn while any protocol with an authentication rate
r > Ca is insecure.
IV. OUR AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
This section extends the 3-round authentication protocol in
[17]. The number n of channel W1 uses in the protocol of [17]
satisfies n ≥ log log |S|
C
, where C is the shannon capacity of
W1 and S is the source space. In this section, we improve the
protocol such that n does not depend on |S| but with the price
that the round complexity is log∗ |S| − log∗ n+ 4. Under our
result, the authentication rate log |S|
n
is proportional to log |S|.
The 3-round protocol in [17] is based on a set system
(S,B1, · · · ,Bb). The idea is as follows. Alice first sends the
source state S to Bob noiselessly. Bob then finds all possible
i’s such that S ∈ Bi and picks a random Bj among them
and sends j to Alice noiselessly. Finally, Alice sends j via
DMC W1 to Bob. The construction is designed such that if
S is modified to S′ by Oscar, then a successful type I attack
implies S′, S ∈ Bj , which is unlikely due to the property of
the set system.
Our new protocol stems from [17] with the following idea.
Essentially, Alice still attempts to authenticate S using a set
system (S,B1, · · · ,Bb). However, she does not sends j over
W1. Instead, he regards j as a new source state in a new
but smaller source space S ′ = [b] and attempts to use a
smaller set system (S ′,B1, · · · ,Bb′) to authenticate j. It is
important to notice that b has the order of log |S| by Lemma
5. Similarly, b′ has the order of log b, which in turn has the
order of log log |S|. So to authenticate j, Alice now only needs
to send a DMC message from a domain of b′ = log log |S|
(instead of a domain of size b = log |S|). That is, two iterations
on the protocol of [17] allow to decrease DMC message to the
log size. Continuing with this idea, if we iterate the protocol
[17] for L times, then conceivably the DMC message will
reduce to a domain size of log(L) |S|. Thus, if the DMC
message length is n, then it suffices to iterate the protocol
in [17] for log∗ |S| − log∗ n + O(1) times (using the fact
log∗m = L + log∗(log(L)m) for any m and L ≤ log∗m).
This gives our desired result. In the following, we implement
this idea rigorously.
A. The construction
For any R < C (C is the shannon capacity over W1),
Shannon capacity theorem tells us that there exists a channel
code C = {C1, · · · , C2n′R} ⊆ Xn
′
that has a maximum error
probability δn′ → 0 exponentially with n′ (see [13]). Assume
C has an encoding fn′ and a decoding gn′ .
For v1 ∈ N, let S = [v1] be the source space. Take ǫ =
2−β1n
′ for some β1 ∈ (0, R/4). Let φ be the minimal even t
s.t. log(t) v1 ≤ β2n′ +
√
n′ for some β2 ∈ (0, R − 4β1). Let
vj+1 = ⌊ 2φ−j+8ǫ4 log vj⌋ for each j < φ. By Lemma 5, there
exists a (vj , vj+1, 2−.25(φ−j)−2ǫvj+1, 2−.5(φ−j)−2ǫ2vj+1)-set
system, which we denote by Sj = (Sj ,Bj,1, · · · ,Bj,vj+1) with
Sj = [vj ]. Assume Alice wants to authenticate source state
s ∈ S. The protocol is described in Fig. 2, where we assume
W1(·|a) 6∈ Cov(W2) for some a ∈ X .
B. Security analysis
Now we analyze the security of our new protocol. Before
this, we first prove the following preparation lemma.
Lemma 7: Let 0 < δ < 1, k ∈ N, v1 > 0 with log(k) v1 ≥
3. If vj+1 ≤ 2k−jδ log vj for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, then
vj+1 <
2k−j log(j) v1
δ
+
2k−(j−1)
δ
log(
2k−(j−1)
δ
).
Proof. The conclusion holds for the initial case j = 0
automatically. Assume it holds for case j − 1. Consider case
j. Let αi = 2
k−(i−1)
δ
log(2
k−(i−1)
δ
) for any i. By induction,
50. Let s1 = s, s0 = 1, L0,i = {1} for any i ∈ [v1].
1. For ℓ = 1 to φ, do the following. Let P1 = P3 =
· · · =Alice and P2 = P4 = · · · =Bob.
a. Pℓ sends sℓ to Pℓ+1 over the noiseless channel,
which, through Oscar, arrives at Pℓ+1 as s′ℓ.
b. Upon s′ℓ, Pℓ+1 checks if sℓ−1 ∈ Bℓ−1,s′ℓ . If
not, (s)he rejects; otherwise, (s)he determines
Lℓ = {Bℓ,i | s′ℓ ∈ Bℓ,i, i ∈ [vℓ+1]}.
Assume Lℓ = {Bℓ,i1 , · · · ,Bℓ,ir} (r might
vary with s′ℓ). If ℓ < φ, (s)he takes sℓ+1
from {i1, i2, · · · , ir} uniformly randomly and
proceeds to iteration ℓ + 1; otherwise (ℓ = φ,
even, Pℓ+1 =Alice), she goes to step 2.
2. Alice sends C∗
s′
φ
= ak|Cs′
φ
over W1 for k =
√
n′.
3. Upon Zn′+k, Bob checks if
|TZk(u)−W1(u|a)| ≤
γ
2|Z|
for all u ∈ Z , where γ = ∆(W1(·|a);Cov(W2)).
If no, he rejects; otherwise, he accepts if and only
if Zk+n
′
k+1 is decoded to sφ.
Fig. 2. Our authentication protocol SetAuth∗
vj+1 <
2k−j
δ
log(2
k−(j−1) log(j−1) v1
δ
+ αj−1)
≤ 2k−j
δ
log(2
k−(j−1) log(j−1) v1
δ
) +
αj−1
2 ln 2·log(j−1) v1
≤ 2k−j
δ
log(j) v1 +
2k−j
δ
log(2
k−(j−1)
δ
) +
αj−1
log(j−1) v1
(∗)
≤ 2k−j
δ
log(j) v1 + 2 ∗ 2k−jδ log(2
k−(j−1)
δ
)
= 2
k−j
δ
log(j) v1 + αj ,
where inequality (∗) uses the fact that log(j−1) v1 ≥
log(k−1) v1 ≥ 23 and that 4x log x ≥ 2x log(2x) for x =
2k−(j−1)
δ
≥ 2. 
Applying the lemma to our construction with δ = 2−8ǫ4
and k = φ− 1, we have
Corollary 1: Keep notions as in protocol SetAuth∗. Then,
vφ < 2
9+4βn′
(
log(φ−1) v1 + 20 + 8βn′
)
. (4)
Theorem 1: If Cov(W1) 6⊆ Cov(W2) and dimW1 > 1,
then SetAuth∗ is a 2−ξ
√
n
-secure authentication protocol for
a constant ξ > 0 with round complexity at most log∗ v1 −
log∗ n+4, where n = n′+
√
n′ is the number of channel W1
uses which does not depend on v1.
Proof. Correctness. When Oscar does not involve in the
attack, sℓ = s′ℓ for all ℓ. From Corollary 1 and 4β1+β2 < R,
we know that vφ < 2n
′R when n′ large enough. Since sφ is
taken from Sφ (of size vφ), Bob will decode Cs′
φ
to s′φ with
an exponentially small error probability, by the assumption of
C. In addition, by Lemma 1, |TZk(u)−W1(u|a)| ≤ γ2|Z| for
all u ∈ Z is violated with an exponentially small probability
too. The correctness follows.
Authentication. By the authentication model, there are two
types of attacks.
Type-I. Oscar revises messages over the noiseless channel
between Alice and Bob such that s1 6= s′1.
Type-II. Oscar plays the role of Alice to interact with bob
to authenticate s˜, where assume that the message in the
iteration ℓ in step 1 is s˜ℓ. Further, at step 2, we assume
Oscar sends C˜∗ over the channel W2 to Bob.
For a type I attack, the success probability is bounded by
P (succ|s′φ 6= sφ) + P (succ|s′φ = sφ). Note that succ event
implies the decoding result gn′(Zk+n
′
k+1 ) = sφ. By correctness
of code C, P (gn′(Zk+n
′
k+1 ) = s
′
φ) > 1−2−n
′α for some α > 0.
So P (succ|s′φ 6= sφ) ≤ 2−n
′α. We thus focus on the case s′φ =
sφ. In this case, as s′1 6= s1, there must exist j < φ such that
s′j 6= sj but s′j+1 = sj+1. In this case, notice that Pj+2 will
verify whether sj ∈ Bj,s′j+1 . We now bound the probability for
this to hold. First, observe that the time order for sj , s′j, sj+1 =
s′j+1 is as follows: Pj generates sj ; then, Oscar revises it to
s′j ; next, upon s′j , Pj+1 generates sj+1; finally, Pj+2(= Pj)
receives s′j+1 = sj+1. Thus, sj+1 = s′j+1 is selected after sj
and s′j have been fixed. By the definition of sj+1, it holds that
s′j ∈ Bj,sj+1 . Since Pj+2 will verify sj ∈ Bj,s′j+1 , it follows
that a successful attack implies sj , s′j ∈ Bj,sj+1 . However, as
sj+1 is uniformly randomly from {i1, · · · , ir}, this probability
is at most 2−.25(φ−j)ǫ, by the property of the set system Sj .
Since j can take any value from 1 to φ− 1, it follows that
P (succ|s′φ = sφ) ≤
φ−1∑
j=1
2−.25(φ−j)ǫ <
2−.25ǫ
1− 2−.25 < 6ǫ.
Hence, a type I attack succeeds with probability at most
2−n
′α + 6ǫ, which is exponentially small as ǫ = 2−βn′.
For a type II attack, assume Bob receives Zn′+k. We claim
PZk
(
|TZk(u)−W1(u|a)| ≤
γ
2|Z| , ∀u
)
≤ 2e−
kγ2
8|Z|2 .
Otherwise, by Lemma 2,
∆
(
W1(·|a);Cov(W2)
)
≤ γ/2 + γ/4 < γ.
This is impossible, as ∆(W1(·|a);Cov(W2)) = γ. This
completes the proof of the authentication property by defining
ξ < γ
2
8|Z|2 .
Finally, as log∗ v1 = φ+log∗(log(φ) v1) and log log(β2n) <
log(φ) v1 ≤ n by the definition of φ, we have φ ≤ log∗ v1 −
log∗ n + 3 (using 2β2n ≥ n) for n large enough. This gives
the round complexity. 
V. LOWER BOUND ON ROUND COMPLEXITY
In this section, we prove a lower bound on the round
complexity of an authentication protocol in our model. Our
strategy is to reduce the problem to a special class of protocols
and then bound the round complexity of the latter.
Toward this, we define Σ1 to be the set of authentication
protocols in our model such that the DMC message over W1
is sent only in the final flow and the final flow has no message
over the noiseless channel.
6In the following, we show that if there is an L-round secure
authentication protocol in our model, there exists a secure
L′-round protocol in Σ1 with L′ ≤ L + 2. Our idea is
that we can move each DMC message Xni in the original
protocol to the noiseless channel of the same flow and in
addition also send Xni over DMC W1 in the final flow.
This modification needs to be careful: the original protocol
could use the DMC output Y ni right after Bob has received it
while the modified protocol only has the noiseless version Xni
(instead of Y ni ). Fortunately, this can be fixed by permitting
Bob to simulate Y ni (letting X ′ni go through a statistical
model that has the same characteristics as channel W1), where
X ′ni is the received version of Xni by Bob over the noiseless
channel. However, this causes a new problem: it is possible
that X ′ni 6= Xni . To overcome this, we actually send Xni in
the final flow using an error-correcting code, through which
Bob can obtain Xni with high probability. In addition, Xni
is coded such that if X ′ni 6= Xni , then the change can be
detected. The formal result is as follows.
Lemma 8: If there exists an L-round ǫ-secure authentication
protocol π in our model, then there exists an L′-round (ǫ +
2−βn
′
)-secure authentication protocol π′ ∈ Σ1 with n′ = µn
for L′ ≤ L+2 and some constants β > 0, µ > 0, where n′, n
are respectively the numbers of channel W1 uses in π′, π.
Proof. Let π be an L-round ǫ-secure authentication protocol
in our model. We construct an L′-round (ǫ + 2−βn′)-secure
authentication protocol π′ from π as follows. W.L.O.G., as-
sume W1(·|a) 6∈ Cov(W2) (by [17], a necessary condition for
ǫ-secure authentication is Cov(W1) 6⊆ Cov(W2)).
i. Alice follows π, except that whenever she needs to
send F over W1, she instead sends it over the noiseless
channel.
ii. Bob follows π, except that whenever he receives F ′ over
the noiseless channel (the received version of F , where
F is supposedly sent over DMC W1 in π), she lets it
go through a simulated W1 and regards the output as the
DMC output in π and proceeds normally according to π.
iii. If the Lth flow in π is from Alice to Bob, then Bob sends
0 as the (L+1)th flow in π′ and the (L+2)th flow will
be the final flow; otherwise, the (L + 1)th flow will be
the final flow. In any case, the final flow in π′ is from
Alice to Bob and defined as follows. Let (F1, · · · , FL)
be the list of messages that are sent over DMC W1 in π.
Since π uses W1 for n times, it follows FL ∈ Xn. Let
n¯ = 2n log |X |
C
, where C is the shannon capacity of W1
(C > 0 is implied by the necessary condition dimW1 >
1 [17]). By Shannon capacity theorem, there exists a code
C ⊆ X n¯ over channel W1 for source M = Xn that has
an exponentially small error probability (say, 2−αn¯ for
some α > 0). Alice encodes (F1, · · · , FL) to X n¯ ∈ C
and sends an¯X n¯ over DMC W1 in the final flow of π′.
iv. Let Y 2n¯ be the received vector in the final flow π′ for
an¯X n¯ over channel W1. Bob will accept the authentica-
tion if and only if
– the original verifications in π are satisfied;
– Y 2n¯n¯+1 decodes to F ′
L (the received version of FL
over the noiseless channel by Bob in π′);
– Y n¯ ∈ Tn¯[W1].5γ (an¯) for γ = ∆(W1(·|a), Cov(W2)).
This completes the description of π′.
Now we analyze the security of π′. Consider a type I attack
first. For any Oscar′ against π′ (executed between Alice′ and
Bob′), we construct Oscar against π (executed between Alice
and Bob). The strategy of Oscar is to maintain a simulated
Alice′ and Bob′ to execute π′ with Oscar′ against it and then
mimic the attack strategy of Oscar′ to attack π. Toward this,
the simulation of Alice′ and Bob′ will rely on the view of
Oscar in the execution of π. Details follow.
- When Alice (or Bob) in π sends M over the noiseless
channel, Oscar lets Alice′ (or Bob′) does the same thing
in π′ and also lets Oscar′ know M . In addition, whenever
Alice sends Fi over channel W1, Oscar lets Alice′ in π′
sends Fi to Bob′ over the noiseless channel.
- When Oscar′ (against π′) changes M to M ′ before the
delivery, Oscar (against π) does the same thing. When
Oscar′ changes Fi to F ′i , Oscar aborts immediately;
otherwise, Oscar′ will deliver Fi without a change (recall
that Alice in π has sent Fi over W1). If Bob in π receives
Y¯ ni over W1 (when Alice sends Fi), then Oscar lets Bob′
use Y¯ ni as the simulated output of W1 with input Fi.
Note this Y¯ ni has the same distribution as the simulated
output by Bob′ in π′ as they are both according to the
statistic model W1.
- In the last round of π′, Oscar simulates Alice′ and Bob′
to act normally. He lets Oscar′ know the input an¯X n¯ and
output Y 2n¯ of DMC W1.
Denote the above attack of Oscar by Γ′. Note that the view of
Oscar′ in Γ′ is according to the distribution in a real attack.
It suffices to bound the success event (denoted by succ′) of
Oscar′ in Γ′. Thus,
P (succ′) = P (succ′, Fi 6= F ′i , ∃i) + P (succ′, FL = F ′L).
Note if (F1, · · · , FL) 6= (F ′1, · · · , F ′L), succ′ implies a de-
coding error for Y 2n¯n¯+1, which is bounded by 2−αn¯ for some
α > 0 (by the classic random coding result as the information
rate is less than log |X |
n
n¯
≤ C/2 < C). Further, when
(F1, · · · , FL) = (F ′1, · · · , F ′L), the success of Oscar′ in π′
implies the success of Oscar in π, which is bounded by ǫ due
to our assumption for π. Hence, P (succ′) ≤ 2−αn¯ + ǫ.
Then, we consider type II attack. In this case, it is similar
to the analysis of type II attack in SetAuth∗ that the success
probability of the attacker is bounded by 2e−
n¯γ2
8|Z|2 .
As a summary, the success probability of type I and II
attacks is bounded by ǫ′ = ǫ + 2−αn¯ + 2e−
n¯γ2
8|Z|2 . Finally,
the number of channel W1 uses in π′ is n′ = 2n¯ = 4n log |X |C .
Thus, a value is negligible in n′ if and only if it is negligible
in n. Thus, π′ is ǫ′-secure under parameter n′. This completes
our proof. 
In the following, we show that we can always assume the
first flow of the protocol is the source state S over the noiseless
channel from Alice. The idea is that the source state is not
confidential and hence the authentication property does not
depend on its secrecy. Thus, if it is not sent in the first flow,
then we can prepend it to the protocol.
7Lemma 9: Let π be an L-round ǫ-secure authentication
protocol in our model for source space S. Let π′ be an
authentication protocol obtained from π as follows:
• The first flow of π′ is the source state S over the noiseless
channel from Alice;
• If the first flow in π is from Alice, then the second flow
of π′ is a constant message 0 over the noiseless channel
from Bob;
• After the preliminary flow(s) above, Alice and Bob start
to execute π normally with S as Alice’s input in π.
Then, π′ is an L′-round ǫ-secure authentication in our model
with L′ ≤ L+ 2.
Proof. If there exists an Oscar′ against π′, we present an
Oscar against π. We describe Oscar for type I and II attacks
as follows. Assume π is run between Alice and Bob and π′
is run between Alice′ and Bob′. The strategy of Oscar is to
simulate Alice′ and Bob′ and run Oscar′ against the execution
of π′. W.L.O.G., assume π starts with Alice.
For a type I attack, Oscar does as follows.
• When Oscar′ invokes Alice′ (in π′) to authenticate S to
Bob′, Oscar simulates Alice′ with input S and sends S
to Bob′, which through Oscar′ will be delivered to Bob′
as S′. Bob′ will then send 0 to Alice′, which we assume
to arrive at Alice′ as 0 (otherwise, Alice′ simply rejects).
In this case, Oscar invokes Alice (in π) with input S.
Further, Oscar simulates Alice′ and Bob′ to start π (as a
subprotocol of π′) with input S, by strictly following the
flows between Alice and Bob. Details follow.
• Whenever Alice (or Bob) sends a message C to Bob (or
Alice) noiselessly, Oscar simulates Alice′ (or Bob′) to
send C to Bob′ (or Alice′) noiselessly as well.
• Whenever Oscar′ delivers a message M ′ to Bob′ (or
Alice′), Oscar delivers M ′ to Bob (or Alice) in π as well.
• Whenever Alice sends a message Xt to Bob over W1,
Oscar simulates Alice′ to send Xt over (virtual) W1 as
well and informs Oscar′ about this. When Xt in π arrives
at Bob as Y t, Oscar delivers Y t to Bob′ as the output of
W1 and also notifies Y t to Oscar′.
From the description of Oscar, the view of Oscar′ is distributed
according to the real attack. Also when Oscar′ successfully
authenticates S′ 6= S to Bob′, Oscar do so to Bob as well, as
the execution of π between Alice′ and Bob′ and the execution
of π between Alice and Bob are identical. Especially, Bob′
accepts S′ if and only if Bob accepts S′. Thus, Oscar has the
same success probability as Oscar′.
For type II attack, Oscar’s strategy is similar, omitted. 
In the following, we will prove our lower bound on the
round complexity. Our idea is as follows. By Lemma 8 and
Lemma 9, we only need to consider a protocol π whose first
flow is the source state S over the noiseless channel from
Alice and the final flow consists of only a DMC message from
Alice, which also is the only flow that has a DMC message.
We first consider such a protocol of 3-round and show that
its source space must be bounded by 21+2|X|
n+1
. If uj−1 is
the first j − 1 flows, then we define Mj(uj−1) to be the set
of all possible messages in the jth flow. For convenience, we
regard reject is also as a possible message. It is immediate
that M3(u2) ⊆ Xn ∪ {reject}. If we sort Xn ∪ {reject} in
any fixed order, M3(u2) can be represented by a binary vector
D(u2) = (d0, · · · , d|X |n), where di = 1 if and only if M3(u2)
contains the ith element in Xn ∪ {reject}. Thus, each D(u2)
must be one of these 2|X |n+1 binary vectors. Now we consider
the case where the second flow u2 is always 0 (constant). In
this case, if |S| > 2|X |n+1, then there must exist u1, u¯1 such
that D(u10) = D(u¯10). Then, Oscar can attack π as follows.
He first requests Alice to authenticate u1 and then modifies
the first flow u1 to u¯1 but keeps other flows unchanged.
Under this attack, Oscar is admissible, as u3 ∈M3(u¯2) from
D(u10) = D(u¯10)). By the correctness of the authentication
protocol, Bob will accept u¯1 and hence Oscar succeeds. This
contradicts the authentication property. Thus, we must have
that |S| ≤ 2|X |n+1. Our foregoing argument is based on the
restriction that u2 is a constant, which is of course not true
usually. However, for the general case, we might still wish to
use a certain variant of this strategy. Specifically, we may try to
define D(u) such that if the number of possible vectors D(u)
is less than |S|, then there must exist two source states u1, u¯1
which share the same possible choices for the second flow and
the third flow. In this case, the above attack can go through.
Toward this, we use D2 to denote all possible D(u2) and define
D(u1) = (d0, · · · , d|D1|), where di = 1 if and only if there
exists u2 such that D(u2) is the ith element in D2 ∪{reject}.
Notice that |D2| ≤ 2|X |n+1. Hence, under our treatment,
an variant of Oscar’s attack above succeeds if the number
of all possible D(u) is less than |S| (which is guaranteed
if |S| > 21+2|X|
n+1
, or roughly log(2) |S| > |X |n). So the
authentication property necessarily implies log(2) |S| ≤ |X |n
(roughly). For a general L-round protocol, we can generalize
the above idea to show that log(L−1) |S| ≤ |X |n (roughly).
From L − 1 = log∗ |S| − log∗(log(L−1) |S|), this gives
L− 1 ≥ log∗ |S| − log∗(|X |n), which is basically our desired
lower bound on the round complexity. We now implement the
above idea rigorously. We start with a claim.
Claim 1. If DL ≥ 3 and Di ≤ 21+Di+1 for any i =
1, · · · , L− 1, then log(L)D1 ≤ 1 + logDL.
Proof. It suffices to prove the bound when Di = 21+Di+1 for
each j, as in this case D1 achieves the largest possible value.
Notice that if logA1 ≤ b+A2 for A2 ≥ 3, then
log(2)A1 ≤ logA2 + log(1 + b
A2
) ≤ logA2 + b
2
. (5)
Hence, from logDj = 1+Dj+1 and Dj+1 ≥ 3 (as DL ≥ 3),
log(2)D1 ≤ logD2 + 1
2
≤ D3 + 1 + 1
2
Using Eq. (5) again, we have
log(3)D1 ≤ logD3 + (1 + 1
2
)/2 ≤ D4 + 1 + 1
2
+
1
22
.
Continuing this evaluation, we have
log(L)D1 ≤ logDL + (1 + 1
2
+ · · ·+ 1
2L−1
)/2
≤ logDL + 1.
This completes the proof. 
8We now formally present our theorem.
Theorem 2: Let π be an L-round ǫ-secure authentication
protocol for source space S. Then L ≥ log∗ |S| − log∗ n− 5,
where n is the number of channel W1 uses.
Proof. We first prove the theorem for π with the following
restrictions: (a) the first flow is the source state S over the
noiseless channel from Alice; (b) the final flow is a DMC
message over W1 from Alice and a DMC message is only
sent in the final flow.
If the first j−1 flows are uj−1, we define Mj(uj−1) to be
the set of possible messages in the jth flow by U ∈ {Alice,
Bob}. Formally, uj ∈ Mj(uj−1) if and only if there exists
random tape r such that the list of messages of U with random
tap r (given the list of incoming message uj−1, uj−3, · · · )
are uj , uj−2, · · · . For convenience, if U rejects (given uj−1),
we regard it as uj =⊥, where ⊥ is different from any legal
message flow. When U rejects, (s)he aborts the execution
immediately. Since ⊥ is not an actual message flow, uj =⊥
will be never delivered. Hence, when U has the view of uj−1
on the first j − 1 flows and is going to compute uj , then
implicitly ui 6=⊥ for any i ≤ j − 1.
By the definition of n, we have uL ∈ Xn∪{⊥}. If uL−1 is
the first L− 1 flows, then we define a (|X |n+1)-dimensional
binary vector D(uL−1) = (d0, d1, · · · , d|X |n), where dt = 1 if
and only if the tth element in Xn ∪ {⊥} (sorted in any fixed
order) belongs to ML(uL−1). Define DL−1 = {D(uL−1) |
uL−1 over all possible choices for the first L− 1 flows}. It
is immediate that |DL−1| ≤ 2|X |n+1. Now if D(uj) and
Dj is well-defined, we define D(uj−1) and Dj−1. Define
D(uj−1) = (d0, d1, · · · , d|Dj |) to be a (|Dj |+ 1)-dimensional
binary vector: di = 1 if and only if there exists uj ∈
Mj(uj−1) such that D(uj) is the ith element in Dj ∪ {⊥},
where Dj ∪{⊥} is sorted in any fixed order. Similarly, define
Dj−1 to be the set of D(uj−1) over all uj−1. Continuing the
iterative definition till D(u1) and D1 is defined. Let Dj = |Dj |
for each j. From our definition, Dj ≤ 21+Dj+1 , ∀j.
Claim 2. If D(uj−1) = D(u¯j−1) for some uj−1 and
u¯j−1, then (i) ⊥∈ Mj(uj−1) if and only if ⊥∈ Mj(u¯j−1);
(ii) uj ∈ Mj(uj−1)\{⊥} if and only if there exists u¯j ∈
Mj(u¯j−1)\{⊥} such that D(uj) = D(u¯j).
Proof. Let D(uj−1) = D(u¯j−1) = (d0, d1, · · · , dQ).
W.L.O.G., ⊥ is the 0th element in Dj ∪{⊥}. Then, the claim
follows from the definition: (i) d0 = 1 iff ⊥∈ Mj(uj−1)
and ⊥∈ Mj(u¯j−1); (ii) di = 1 for i > 0 if and only
if there exists uj ∈ Mj(uj−1) such that D(uj) is the ith
element in Dj ∪ {⊥}. Especially, under the existence for (ii),
D(uj) = D(u¯j) is the ith element in Dj ∪ {⊥}. 
Now we claim |S| ≤ D1; otherwise, we construct an Oscar
who breaks the authentication property as follows. Since |S| >
D1, there must exist distinct u1, u¯1 ∈ S such that D(u1) =
D(u¯1). Then, the code of Oscar is as follows.
• Oscar provides u1 to Alice as her source state input.
When Alice sends u1 to Bob noiselessly, Oscar revises it
to u¯1 and sends it to Bob.
• Assume the (j-1)th flow has been handled and D(uj−1) =
D(u¯j−1). We handle the jth flow for j < L as follows.
– If Alice sends uj to Bob (uj ∈ Mj(uj−1)\{⊥}),
then by Claim 2 there exists u¯j ∈ Mj(u¯j−1)\{⊥}
such that D(uj) = D(u¯j). Oscar revises uj to u¯j and
sends it to Bob.
– If Alice rejects with a local output uj =⊥, then
⊥∈ Mj(uj−1) by definition. By Claim 2, ⊥∈
Mj(u¯j−1), Oscar rejects Bob with a local output
u¯j =⊥.
– The case that Bob sends u¯j is handled similarly.
• Finally, when Alice outputs uL =⊥, the case is sim-
ilar to uj =⊥ for j < L; when Alice sends uL ∈
ML(uL−1)\{⊥} to Bob, Oscar can not change it (in
this case, we define u¯L = uL). However, based on
the definition of ML(uL−1) and the previous item that
D(uL−1) = D(u¯L−1), we know that u¯L ∈ML(uL−1) =
ML(u¯L−1). When Bob receives u¯L, if he outputs u¯1,
then Oscar succeeds; otherwise, he fails.
Now we analyze the success probability p of Oscar. First
of all, Alice is a sender with a uniformly random tape and
especially is admissible. Thus, uj ∈ Mj(uj−1) for any j. By
our analysis in the attack, u¯j ∈ Mj(u¯j−1) as well. Thus, by
the definition of admissible and the definition of ML(·), Alice′
is an admissible sender in the execution (Alice′, Bob). By cor-
rectness, Bob will output u¯1 with probability at least 1−η > ǫ,
contradiction to the authentication property (as u¯1 6= u1).
Thus, |S| ≤ D1. Finally, as logDj ≤ 1+Dj+1 for any j (let
DL = |Xn), Claim 1 implies that log(L)D1 ≤ 1 + logDL =
1 + n log |X |. Hence, log(L) |S| ≤ 1 + n log |X |. Thus,
log∗ |S| = L + log∗(log(L) |S|) ≤ L + log∗(1 + n log |X |).
This concludes the theorem for π satisfying the restrictions at
the beginning.
For the general case, notice that for any L-round ǫ au-
thentication protocol π, by Lemma 8 and Lemma 9, there
exists an (L + 4)-round (ǫ + 2−βn′)-secure authentication
protocol π′ with n′ = γn for some constants β > 0, γ > 0
that satisfies the restriction at the beginning, where n and
n′ are respectively the number of channel W1 uses in π
and π′. Applying the above proof to π′, we conclude that
log∗ |S| ≤ L + 4 + log∗(1 + nγ log |X |) ≤ L+ 4 + log∗(2n)
when n large enough. Hence, the theorem follows. 
VI. LOWER BOUND ON THE SUCCESS PROBABILITY
In this paper, we regard the DMC W1 as an important
resource and hope to minimize the use of it. For a fixed total
length of messages over it and a fixed authentication error
ǫ, we might wish to authenticate a source space as large as
possible. However, the following theorem shows that ǫ is very
dependent on the message space on DMC W1.
Our idea is to present an Oscar that achieves a certain
success probability. Roughly, when Alice is authenticating S
to Bob, Oscar blocks the communication between Alice and
Bob. In addition, Oscar plays the role of ‘Bob’ to interact
with Alice. At the same time, Oscar starts an independent
session to play the role of ‘Alice’ to authenticate a new
message S′ to Bob, except that he uses Alice’s DMC messages
in the previous session as his own. Here two authentication
sessions are independent, except that they use the same DMC
9messages. By calculation, we can show that two independent
sessions share the same DMC messages with probability at
least 2−H(F ). When this event occurs, Bob will accept S′,
except a completeness error error. So Oscar succeeds with
probability at least 2−H(F ) − δ − 1|S| , where 1|S| accounts for
the possibility of S = S′. The formal detail is as follows.
Theorem 3: Let π be an ǫ-secure authentication protocol in
our model for source space S with correctness error δ. Assume
F is the concatenation of messages over DMC W1 by Alice
(if some flow does not contain a DMC message, use an empty
symbol to represent the DMC message in this flow). Let F
be the space of F . Then, ǫ ≥ 2−H(F ) − δ − 1|S| . Especially,
ǫ ≥ 1|F| − δ − 1|S| .
Proof. We now present a strategy for Oscar to achieve the
claimed lower bound. Oscar first generates S′ ← S and then
simulates two parties: Alice′ and Bob′ to conduct a type I
attack (denoted by Γ) as follows.
• When Alice interacts with Bob for authenticating S ← S,
Bob′ intercepts and blocks all the messages from Alice,
except the messages over DMC W1. In addition, Bob′, in
the role of Bob, interacts with Alice faithfully, except that
he simulates the output of W1 using the input from Alice
(recall that Oscar can see the input of Alice over W1). In
addition, Alice′ intercepts and blocks all the messages
from Bob. She then interacts with Bob faithfully to
authenticate S′, except that she regards each message
over DMC W1 from Alice as her own message to Bob.
In this attack, Oscar succeeds if and only if Bob outputs S′
(denoted by event Good) and S′ 6= S. So P (succ(Oscar) ≥
P (Good)− P (S′ = S) = P (Good)− 1/|S|.
In the following, we analyze P (Good). Toward this, we
consider a mental variant (denoted by Γ′) of Oscar’s attack Γ,
where the difference is as follows.
- Bob′ does not use the simulated output of W1 and instead
he can also intercept and block the channel W1 and use
the channel output.
- Alice′ does not use the messages W1 from Alice as her
own W1 messages to Bob. Instead, she can send messages
directly onto W1 and Bob can receive the corresponding
output.
In other words, Bob′ and Alice′ is changed such that (Alice,
Bob′) and (Alice′, Bob) maintain two independent protocol
executions, where the former is to authenticate S ← S while
the latter is to authenticate S′ ← S.
Let F1 be the messages over W1 in execution (Alice, Bob′)
and F2 be the messages over W1 in execution (Alice′, Bob).
Observe that a simulated W1 and a real W1 have the same
statistical characteristics. It follows that, conditional on F1 =
F2, Γ
′ and Γ are distributed identically. Let PΓ(E) denote the
event E in an experiment Γ. Then,
PΓ(Good) ≥PΓ(Good|F1 = F2)PΓ(F1 = F2)
=PΓ
′
(Good|F1 = F2)PΓ(F1 = F2)
≥PΓ′(Good|F1 = F2)PΓ
′
(F1 = F2)
(PΓ(F1 = F2) = 1 by definition of Γ)
=PΓ
′
(Good, F1 = F2) (6)
Further, in Γ′, executions (Alice, Bob′) and (Alice′, Bob) are
independent. Also, F1 is an event in the execution of (Alice,
Bob′) while (Good, F2) is an event in the execution of (Alice′,
Bob). So F1 is independent of (Good, F2). Thus,
Eq. (6)
=
∑
a∈F P
Γ′(Good, F2 = a)PΓ
′
(F1 = a)
≥∑a∈F PΓ′(F2 = a)PΓ′(F1 = a)− δ
/∗ execution (Alice′, Bob) is faithfully according to π
and so PΓ′(Good) ≥ 1− δ. ∗/
=
∑
a∈F P
2
F (a)− δ,
/∗ F1, F2 are i.i.d. according to the corresponding RV F
of a faithful execution of π. ∗/
≥ 2−H(F ) − δ,
/∗ log(∑x P 2X(x)) ≥ −H(X) as log(x) is concave ∗/
This gives the first conclusion. The second one follows from
H(F ) ≤ |F|. This completes the proof. 
VII. THE CAPACITY OF NON-INTERACTIVE
AUTHENTICATION OVER ANY DMC
In this section, we study a non-interactive case of the keyless
authentication in our model: the protocol consists only of one
message flow (Xn, u) sent from Alice to Bob, where Xn is
over channel W1 and u is over the noiseless channel. The
authentication capacity in this setting with BSCs W1 and W2
was obtained in [17]. In the following, we extend it to the
general DMC setting.
Our idea is as follows. By Lemma 4, we have a subset C
of size |Xn(1−δ) for an arbitrarily small δ > 0 such that any
two elements in C has a large distance. By Lemma 3, if we
send Ci ∈ C over DMC, Bob will not confuse it with Cj ∈ C,
in the sense of the presence of a type I attack. So C can be
used to authenticate a source space of size |X |n(1−δ) against
type I attack. A type II attack can be combated using the same
idea in SetAuth∗. This gives a scheme with an authentication
rate of (1 − δ) log |X |. Since δ is arbitrarily small, any rate
less than log |X | can be achieved. On the other hand, it is
obvious that the rate can not surpass log |X | as the noiseless
channel is insecure and hence one codeword over DMC W1
can authenticate at most one source state.
Theorem 4: The capacity of a non-interactive authentica-
tion in our model with W1 non-redundant and Cov(W1) 6⊆
Cov(W2) is log |X |.
Proof. Achievability. For any α ∈ (1/n, 1/2], by Lemma 4,
there exists C ⊆ Xn such that any two elements in it have
distance at least αn and that |C| ≥ |X |
n(1−α−
h(α)
log |X|
)
αn
. Now let
C = {C1, · · · , CN}.
Let k =
√
n. Since Cov(W1) 6⊆ Cov(W2), there
exists a ∈ X such that W1(·|a) 6∈ Cov(W2). So
∆(W1(·|a), Cov(W2)) = ξ for some ξ > 0. Let ǫ =
min{ ξ4|Z| , αΘ2 } and ǫ′ = 2e
− kξ2
8|Z|2 , where Θ is defined in
Lemma 3 for the non-redundant DMC W1. We construct the
protocol for Alice to authenticate s ∈ [N ] as follows.
1. Alice sends ak|Cs over channel W1 and s over the
noiseless channel.
2. Upon Zn+k from channel W1 and s′ from the noiseless
channel, Bob checks if Zk ∈ Tk[W1]ǫ(ak) and Zk+nk+1 ∈
Tn[W1]ǫ(Cs′). If yes, he outputs s′; otherwise, he rejects.
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Consider a type II attack first. Assume Oscar sends Xk+n
over W2. We claim that PZk(Tk[W1]ǫ(ak)) ≤ ǫ′ (in other
words, PZk
(
|TZk(u)−W1(u|a)| ≤ ǫ|Z| , for all u ∈ Z
)
≤ ǫ′).
Otherwise, by Lemma 2,
∆
(
W1(·|a), Cov(W2)
)
≤|Z|ǫ+ |Z|
√
ln (2/ǫ′)
2k
≤ξ
4
+
ξ
4
< ξ,
which contradicts ∆(W1(·|a), Cov(W2)) = ξ. Thus, a type II
attack succeeds with probability at most ǫ′ = 2e−
kξ2
8|Z|2 .
We now consider a type I attack. In this case, Oscar
succeeds only if Zk+nk+1 ∈ Tn[W1]ǫ(Cs′) for s′ 6= s. However,
dH(Cs, Cs′) > αn. By Lemma 3,
W1(Tn[W1]ǫ(Cs′)|Cs) ≤2
− 2n(αΘ−ǫ)2
|X|2|Z|2 ≤ 2− nα
2Θ2
2|X|2|Z|2 , (7)
exponentially small!
Authentication rate is limn→∞ 1n+k log
|X |n(1−α−
h(α)
log |X|
)
αn
=
[1− α− h(α)log |X | ] log |X |. Since α is arbitrarily small, any rate
less than log |X | can be achieved.
Converse. Since any point in Xn can be a codeword for at
most one source s (recall the noiseless channel can be modified
arbitrarily), the authentication rate is at most log |X |. 
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we further studied the keyless authentication
problem in the noisy model of our previous work [17]. We
extended the construction in [17]. If the message space is S
and the number of channel W1 uses is n, then our new protocol
has a round complexity log∗ |S| − log∗ n + 4. Here n can
be chosen independent of S while this is impossible in the
protocol of [17]. We proved a lower bound log∗ |S|−log∗ n−5
on the round complexity. We also obtained a lower bound on
the success probability. Finally, we showed the capacity for a
non-interactive authentication under general DMCs W1,W2 is
log |X |, which extends the result under BSCs in [17].
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